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AGENCY SETTLEMENT REVIEWABILITY 
Dustin Plotnick* 
 
Administrative agency settlements have recently come under increased 
judicial scrutiny.  Agency actions are presumptively reviewable under the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which means they are generally 
subject to, among other requirements, “arbitrary and capricious” review 
under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) and Motor Vehicles Manufacturing Ass’n of the 
United States v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.  In contrast, 
the U.S. Supreme Court held in Heckler v. Chaney that agency no-action 
decisions are presumptively unreviewable because they are “committed to 
agency discretion by law” under 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2).  Are agency 
settlements also presumptively unreviewable?  In other words, are they 
more like actions or no-action decisions? 
The Supreme Court has twice analyzed agency settlement decisions but 
has never reached the “committed to agency discretion by law” question.  
While the D.C. Circuit has ruled that such settlements are presumptively 
unreviewable, no other circuit has established binding precedent on the 
issue, and the Ninth Circuit has reviewed agency settlements in several 
discrete cases.  This Note argues that, based on the criteria put forward in 
Heckler v. Chaney, agency settlements are not presumptively unreviewable.  
They are, in short, more like actions than no-action decisions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Administrative agency settlements have recently come under increased 
judicial scrutiny.  In the summer of 2010, the Securities Exchange 
Commission (SEC) entered a $535 million fine settlement consent 
judgment against Goldman Sachs for providing incomplete information to 
investors in the well-publicized “Abacus” deal.1  Goldman was alleged to 
have made about $15 million in profits on the deal.2  In autumn 2011, the 
SEC filed a similar consent judgment against Citigroup, except this time the 
fine was only $95 million while the alleged illicit profits were considerably 
higher, $160 million.3  Judge Jed Rakoff of the Southern District of New 
York rejected the Citigroup consent judgment,4 and noted that the 
discrepancy between the fines in the Goldman and Citigroup cases 
“troubled” him.5 
Both cases had gone before the court because they were consent 
judgments, which, unlike regular agency settlements, are necessarily subject 
to court approval.6  The SEC, however, could just as easily have skirted 
consent judgment review by dropping an injunction against further 
wrongdoing from the agreement.7  This would have achieved substantially 
the same result,8 but without the scrutiny of consent judgment approval. 
However, to what extent would this move have actually allowed the SEC 
to escape judicial review?  Agency actions are presumptively reviewable 
under the Administrative Procedure Act9 (APA), which imposes a broad set 
of restrictions on agencies, including that their actions must not be 
“arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion.”10  The APA, however, 
 
 1. See Consent of Defendant Goldman, Sachs & Co., SEC v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 
No. 10 Civ. 3229 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2010) (No. 25), available at http://www.sec.gov/
litigation/litreleases/2010/consent-pr2010-123.pdf; see also Louise Story & Gretchen 
Morgenson, S.E.C. Accuses Goldman of Fraud in Housing Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2010, 
at A1.  The Abacus deal involved the sale of financial securities related to the housing 
market. 
 2. See Consent of Defendant Goldman, Sachs & Co., supra note 1, at 1 (consenting to a 
disgorgement of $15 million). 
 3. See SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 4. Id. at 335. 
 5. Id. at 334 n.7. 
 6. See infra note 78. 
 7. See John C. Coffee Jr., Collision Course:  The SEC and Judge Rakoff, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 
19, 2012, at 5, 7 (“The SEC could settle with the defendants for monetary damages and 
withdraw its request for injunctive relief.”); see also Joel S. Jacobs, Compromising NEPA?  
The Interplay Between Settlement Agreements and the National Environmental Policy Act, 
19 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 113, 116–17 (1995) (“Settlement agreements are contracts that 
resolve pending disputes between parties.  Consent decrees are settlement agreements that 
enlist the powers of the court, in particular the power to hold parties in contempt . . . .”). 
 8. See Coffee, supra note 7, at 6–7 (“[It is not] credible that the injunctive relief is that 
important to the SEC (at least in the case of large corporate defendants) because the SEC 
never seeks to enforce its injunctions through contempt . . . .”). 
 9. 5 U.S.C. § 500 (2006); see Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 139–41 (1967); 
see also Ronald M. Levin, Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative Law, 74 MINN. 
L. REV. 689, 702 (1990). 
 10. 5 U.S.C. § 706. See generally HARRY T. EDWARDS & LINDA A. ELLIOT, FEDERAL 
COURTS STANDARDS OF REVIEW:  APPELLATE COURT REVIEW OF DISTRICT COURT DECISIONS 
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expressly exempts agency actions from judicial review if either the agency 
statute precludes judicial review11 or the actions are “committed to agency 
discretion by law” under 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2).  The central question of this 
Note is whether agency settlements fall within the § 701(a)(2) exemption.  
The issue of settlement reviewability is especially important because 
settlements now resolve the vast majority of agency enforcement actions.12 
From a policy perspective, whether agency settlements fall under the 
§ 701(a)(2) exception is a contentious issue.  On one hand, agency 
autonomy is beneficial because agencies have unique expertise that is useful 
for setting agency priorities and estimating the likelihood of success when 
engaging in enforcement actions.13  On the other hand, judicial review 
under the APA was established to ward off arbitrariness and abuses of 
discretion.14  Agency accountability to elected officials is limited, and may 
be insufficient on its own at alleviating these concerns.15 
The U.S. Supreme Court has addressed the § 701(a)(2) exemption on 
several occasions, but not in the settlement context.16  In the landmark case 
of Heckler v. Chaney, the Supreme Court held that agency decisions not to 
initiate an enforcement action are presumptively unreviewable under 
§ 701(a)(2).17  The D.C. Circuit extended Chaney to hold that settlements 
are presumptively unreviewable,18 but no other circuit has established 
binding precedent on the matter.19 
 
AND AGENCY ACTIONS 167 (2007) (describing the standard for reviewing agency actions).  
For an overview of the relevant factors for determining whether an agency action is 
“arbitrary and capricious,” see infra Part I.B. 
 11. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1). 
 12. See Richard M. Cooper, The Need for Oversight of Agency Policies for Settling 
Enforcement Actions, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 835, 835 (2007); see also Lars Noah, 
Administrative Arm-Twisting in the Shadow of Congressional Delegations of Authority, 1997 
WIS. L. REV. 873, 891. 
 13. See infra Part II.D.1. 
 14. See infra Part II.D.2. 
 15. See infra Part II.D.2. 
 16. The Court examined discrete agency settlement decisions in two cases, but in neither 
case did it analyze the § 701(a)(2) question, either to adopt a general rule or to analyze the 
particular application of the subsection in that case. See NLRB v. United Food & 
Commercial Workers Union, 484 U.S. 112, 133 n.31 (1987) (“Because we find APA review 
precluded by statute, we need not address petitioners’ alternative argument that 5 U.S.C. 
§ 701(a)(2) (acts committed to agency discretion) also bars review.”); Cuyahoga Valley Ry. 
Co. v. United Transp. Union, 474 U.S. 3, 5 n.1 (1985) (“[T]he cases do not pose the question 
whether an agency’s decision, resting on jurisdictional concerns, not to take enforcement 
action is presumptively immune from judicial review under the Administrative Procedure 
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2).”). 
 17. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830–32 (1985) (holding unreviewable under 
5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) the Food and Drug Administration’s denial of a petition by death row 
inmates that the agency review lethal injection drugs for violation of the Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetics Act).  For a description of when the presumption may be rebutted, see infra note 
124. 
 18. See, e.g., Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. EPA, 494 F.3d 1027, 1031 (D.C. Cir. 2007); 
see also infra Part III.A. 
 19. In a nonprecedential opinion, the Third Circuit followed the D.C. Circuit, holding 
that settlements are presumptively unreviewable. See Mahoney v. U.S. Consumer Prods. 
Safety Comm’n, 146 F. App’x 587, 590 (3d Cir. 2005).  The Ninth Circuit, on the other 
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Is a settlement more like a decision to act or not to act?  This Note argues 
that settlements should not be entitled to the presumption of unreviewability 
because they do not meet the legal criteria put forward in Heckler v. 
Chaney.20 
This Note proceeds in four parts.  Part I discusses the APA and agency 
settlement generally.  Part II explains the Supreme Court’s § 701(a)(2) 
jurisprudence.  Next, Part III examines the D.C. Circuit’s agency settlement 
jurisprudence, which holds settlements presumptively unreviewable under 
§ 701(a)(2).  Finally, Part IV argues that settlements should not be entitled 
to the presumption of unreviewability. 
I.  APA REVIEW AND AGENCY SETTLEMENT 
The D.C. Circuit adopted its agency settlement rule on the basis of the 
APA’s “committed to agency discretion by law” exception to judicial 
review, 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2).  But before diving into the meaning of 
§ 701(a)(2) or the D.C. Circuit’s agency settlement jurisprudence, it is 
necessary to examine the basics of APA review and provide a brief 
overview of agency action, including agency settlement.  Part I.A discusses 
the statutory framework for agency review.  Part I.B examines “arbitrary 
and capricious” review, which is particularly important for analyzing the 
reviewability question, in greater detail.  Finally, Part I.C introduces the 
topic of agency settlements. 
A.  Administrative Agencies and the APA 
Under the APA, “agency” is defined as “each authority of the 
Government of the United States,” excluding Congress, the courts, 
governments of territories, and the military.21  Judge Harry Edwards and 
Linda Elliot add that administrative agencies are organizations that are not 
expressly designated by the U.S. Constitution but nonetheless wield 
“authority of the Government of the United States.”22  The Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and SEC 
are typical examples of administrative agencies. 
Administrative agencies are generally created through, or authorized by, 
congressional statute.  For example, the SEC was created by the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934.23  The EPA, on the other hand, was originally 
 
hand, rejected § 701(a)(2) challenges to reviewability of individual settlement decisions in at 
least two cases, but neither case established a general rule of reviewability. See United States 
v. Carpenter, 526 F.3d 1237, 1241 (9th Cir. 2008); Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v. Bonneville 
Power Admin., 501 F.3d 1009, 1013, 1031–32 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 20. 470 U.S. at 830–32. 
 21. 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2006). 
 22. See EDWARDS & ELLIOT, supra note 10, at 97 (quoting Franklin v. Massachusetts, 
505 U.S. 788, 800 (1992)). 
 23. Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (“There is hereby established a Securities and 
Exchange Commission . . . .”). 
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formed by an executive order that reorganized some prior agencies,24 but, 
after legality concerns, Congress supported the reorganization through 
statute.25 
These statutes are called “organic” statutes.26  Organic statutes declare 
the “basic mission of an agency, its principal responsibilities, and its 
authority to act.”27  They also sometimes specify judicial reviewing 
standards of the agency actions they authorize.28 
In addition to their organic statutes, agencies also have powers and 
restrictions created by the APA.29  The APA effectively creates a set of 
default rules that apply unless expressly countermanded by Congress.30  For 
example, the APA divides all forms of agency actions into four categories:  
formal adjudications, formal rulemakings, informal rulemakings, and an 
implied catch-all category, informal adjudications.31  The APA imposes a 
detailed set of procedural requirements on the various types of agency 
actions.32  Failure to adhere to these procedural requirements is grounds for 
challenging the action in an Article III court.33 
Agency actions are presumptively subject to judicial review under the 
APA,34 but can be exempt for two reasons.  First, they can be unreviewable 
under § 701(a)(1) of the APA if Congress has passed a statute precluding 
judicial review.35  Second, agency actions can be unreviewable under 
§ 701(a)(2) if they are “committed to agency discretion by law.”36  The 
Supreme Court has ruled that agency no-action decisions are presumptively 
 
 24. The EPA was established by Reorganization Plan 3 of 1970, an executive order of 
President Nixon. See 40 C.F.R. § 1.1 (2013). 
 25. Reorganization Act Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-614, 98 Stat. 3192. 
 26. See, e.g., Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the APA?  What the 
Patent System Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 279 (2007) (“Federal 
statutes, known as organic statutes, create administrative agencies and empower them to take 
a range of actions, usually including informal rulemaking and different types of 
adjudication.”); Jonathan R. Siegel, Textualism and Contextualism in Administrative Law, 78 
B.U. L. REV. 1023, 1033 (1998) (referring to administrative agency organic statutes). 
 27. See EDWARDS & ELLIOT, supra note 10, at 97. 
 28. See Benjamin & Rai, supra note 26, at 279. 
 29. 5 U.S.C. §§ 500–559 (2006). 
 30. See Benjamin & Rai, supra note 26, at 279–80. 
 31. See JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND REGULATION 
584 (2010). 
 32. See id. 
 33. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D). 
 34. See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 139–41 (1967); see also Levin, supra 
note 9, at 702. 
 35. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1).  For example, in Sackett v. EPA, homeowners challenged the 
EPA’s issuance of an administrative compliance order under the Clean Water Act. Sackett v. 
EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1367 (2012).  The EPA argued that the Clean Water Act precludes 
judicial review of compliance orders because, among other reasons, the Act gives the EPA a 
choice of advancing by judicial proceeding or administrative action, implying the 
administrative action is precluded from judicial review. Id. at 1373.  The Court noted that it 
presumes administrative agency actions are reviewable but then examines the express 
language and intent of the statute for signs to the contrary. Id. at 1372–73.  Ultimately, the 
Court held the statute did not preclude judicial review. Id. at 1374. 
 36. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2). 
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unreviewable under § 701(a)(2).37  This Note asks whether agency 
settlements should also be entitled to a presumption of unreviewability 
under § 701(a)(2). 
B.  Arbitrary and Capricious Review 
It is important, at the outset, to explain some circumstances under which 
an agency action may be set aside.  In addition to the procedural 
requirements identified above, the APA prohibits all agency actions that are 
“arbitrary, capricious, [or an] abuse of discretion.”38  This clause is 
generally held to refer to a single standard, called “arbitrary and capricious 
review.”39 
Arbitrary and capricious review includes an expansive set of restrictions.  
Agencies must not 
[rely] on factors which Congress has not intended [them] to consider, 
entirely fail to consider an important aspect of the problem, offer[] an 
explanation . . . that runs counter to the evidence before [them], or [offer 
an explanation that] is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a 
difference in view or the product of agency expertise.40 
For example, in the landmark case of Motor Vehicles Manufacturing Ass’n 
of the United States v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., the 
Supreme Court invalidated an order by the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration (NHTSA) that rescinded an earlier requirement that cars be 
manufactured with passive restraints (automatic seatbelts and air bags).41  
The Court held that the order was arbitrary and capricious because the 
agency didn’t adequately explain removing the seatbelt requirement and did 
not examine air bag effectiveness at all.42 
Under arbitrary and capricious review, agencies must adduce reasons for 
reversing precedent during adjudications.43  For example, in Allentown 
Mack Sales & Service, Inc. v. NLRB, the Supreme Court rejected the 
NLRB’s decision to apply a “clear and convincing” evidentiary standard to 
a particular employer requirement after the Board had previously 
announced that a “preponderance of the evidence” standard would apply in 
those cases, because “reasoned decisionmaking,” which is a requirement of 
the arbitrary and capricious standard, “demands it.”44 
 
 37. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985). 
 38. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). 
 39. See EDWARDS & ELLIOT, supra note 10, at 167. 
 40. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 
29, 43 (1983). 
 41. Id. at 34. 
 42. See EDWARDS & ELLIOT, supra note 10, at 169. 
 43. See id. at 168 (citing Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 
374–77 (1998)); see also Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of 
Arbitrariness Review, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 761 (2008) (“[A]gencies were required to . . . 
justify departures from past practices . . . .”). 
 44. Allentown Mack, 522 U.S. at 376. 
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Likewise, if an agency has established a general policy by rule or settled 
course of adjudication that governs its discretion, the agency must supply a 
reason when departing from the policy in order to clear arbitrary and 
capricious review.45  This applies even if the agency originally had 
“unfettered discretion.”46  In INS v. Yang, an immigrant who had gained 
entry to the United States through a fraudulent scheme, argued that the INS 
improperly denied him a deportation waiver by considering the fraud even 
though the agency had a “settled policy” of disregarding such frauds.47  The 
Court reasoned that if the INS had disregarded its settled policy, its waiver 
denial could be void as arbitrary and capricious, but ultimately decided that 
the INS had not disregarded its policy.48 
One scholar, Professor Ronald Levin, has observed that some forms of 
abuse of discretion challenges do not rely upon an assertion that the agency 
“misunderstood its governing statute or any other source of legal 
constraints.”49  He calls these “pure” abuse of discretion theories.50  
Examples of “pure” abuse of discretion allegations include when agencies 
misunderstand the facts, depart from precedents without good justification, 
fail to reason in a “minimally plausible fashion,” and make “unconscionable 
value judgment[s].”51  State Farm, because it involved a rejection for an 
agency’s failure to present an adequate factual basis for its determination, 
could be considered a “pure” abuse of discretion case.52  Rust v. Sullivan 
presents a good contrary example.53  The Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS) had restricted Title X funds from being used for abortion 
counseling, referral, and advocacy as a method of family planning.54  Title 
X provided that “[n]one of the funds appropriated under this subchapter 
shall be used in programs where abortion is a method of family planning.”55  
The restriction on counseling was a “sharp break” with prior interpretations 
of the statute,56 and the Supreme Court analyzed the change in 
interpretation for abuse of discretion, holding that “the Secretary amply 
justified his change of interpretation with a ‘reasoned analysis.’”57 
 
 45. M.B. v. Quarantillo, 301 F.3d 109, 112–13 (3rd Cir. 2002) (“[A]lthough its 
discretion may be unfettered at the outset, if an agency ‘announces and follows—by rule or 
by settled course of adjudication—a general policy by which its exercise of discretion will be 
governed, an irrational departure from that policy . . . could constitute action that must be 
overturned as [arbitrary and capricious].’” (quoting INS v. Yang, 519 U.S. 26, 32 (1996))). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Yang, 519 U.S. at 30–31. 
 48. Id. at 32. 
 49. Levin, supra note 9, at 708. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 
29, 43 (1983). 
 53. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
 54. See id. at 178–79.  Title X of the Public Health Service Act provides federal funding 
for family planning services. See id. 
 55. Id. at 178 (alterations in original) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 300a-6 (1988)). 
 56. Id. at 186. 
 57. Id. at 187 (quoting State Farm, 463 U.S. at 42); see also EDWARDS & ELLIOT, supra 
note 10, at 179 (“The Court upheld the change both because the new regulations espoused a 
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As explained in greater detail in Part II.A, the existence of “pure” abuse 
of discretion theories complicates the analysis of the proper scope of the 
§ 701(a)(2) exception because the exception is arguably based—at least in 
part—on the existence of a valid basis for setting aside the agency action.58 
C.  Agency Settlement 
This section gives an overview of agency settlements and then describes 
two related concepts, consent decrees and plea bargains.  As explained in 
detail below, most of the recent controversies involved consent decrees.  
Plea bargains, meanwhile, are relevant as a basis for comparison to agency 
settlements. 
1.  Overview of Agency Settlements 
The APA does not expressly contemplate the possibility that enforcement 
proceedings might be settled, and scholars have identified this area as a 
“‘blind spot’” within administrative law.59  The issue of settlements is 
especially important because they now resolve the “vast majority of 
enforcement actions by federal agencies against public companies and other 
major institutions,”60 making the “blind spot” quite large. 
The archetypal agency settlement, for purposes of this Note, occurs when 
an agency arguably has authority to sanction a private party through an 
adjudication but ultimately agrees not to in exchange for consideration from 
the party.  For example, in Mahoney v. United States Consumer Products 
Safety Commission,61 the U.S. Consumer Products Safety Commission 
(CPSC) issued an administrative complaint against a BB gun manufacturer, 
and, while the adjudicatory proceeding was in discovery, the manufacturer 
made a settlement offer to the CPSC, which the agency accepted.62 
The issue of judicial review of settlements generally arises when an 
aggrieved third party dislikes the settlement terms.  In Mahoney, the parents 
of a boy injured by a defective BB gun challenged the CPSC’s settlement 
with the BB gun manufacturer.63  Likewise, in United States v. Carpenter, 
an environmental group challenged a proposed settlement between the 
United States and a group of local residents who were trespassing on 
 
permissible interpretation under Chevron Step Two and because the agency’s decision to 
change its position was supported by the reasoned decisionmaking required by State 
Farm.”).  “Reasoned decisionmaking” refers to an arbitrary and capricious review standard. 
See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
 58. See infra Part II.A. 
 59. Jim Rossi, Bargaining in the Shadow of Administrative Procedure:  The Public 
Interest in Rulemaking Settlement, 51 DUKE L.J. 1015, 1016 (2001) (quoting Elizabeth Fisher 
& Patrick Schmidt, Seeing the “Blind Spots” in Administrative Law:  Theory, Practice, and 
Rulemaking Settlements in the United States, 37 COMMON L. WORLD REV. 272, 273 (2001)) 
(referring to rulemaking settlements, but relevant to settlements generally). 
 60. Cooper, supra note 12, at 835; see also Noah, supra note 12, at 891. 
 61. 146 F. App’x 587 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 62. Id. at 588. 
 63. Id. at 589. 
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federal land to restore a roadway to a wilderness preserve.64  The proposed 
settlement would have permitted the residents to continue traversing the 
land, but the environmental group believed this activity would harm a 
population of local trout, so it brought an action demanding participation in 
the settlement negotiations.65 
Third parties have standing to challenge agency actions, including 
settlements, under section 702 of the APA, which states that “[a] person 
suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or 
aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is 
entitled to judicial review thereof.”66 
Although the Supreme Court has not definitively ruled on the matter, 
agency settlements can be subject to third party challenges because they are 
final actions.67  In support of this viewpoint, the Ninth Circuit noted that the 
Supreme Court has held that an Attorney General no-action decision was 
nonetheless an agency action for purposes of section 702.68 
There are strong policy arguments both for and against the proliferation 
of agency settlements.  Settlements can impose large costs on private 
parties that may have little bargaining power,69 stifle development of the 
law,70 and restrict the discretion of an agency in the future.71  On the other 
hand, agency settlements provide agencies with greater discretion to 
manage finite resources,72 and, like all settlements, help parties by reducing 
outcome uncertainty.73 
 
 
 
 64. United States v. Carpenter, 526 F.3d 1237, 1238–39 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 65. Id. 
 66. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006).  Third parties must also surmount constitutional challenges to 
standing. See, e.g., Salmon River Concerned Citizens v. Robertson, 32 F.3d 1346, 1353 (9th 
Cir. 1994) (“The doctrine of standing encompasses both constitutional and statutory 
considerations.”); Coeur d’Alene Lake v. Kiebert, 790 F. Supp. 998, 1004–05 (D. Idaho 
1992) (“In the case at hand, the minimum standing requirements of Article III must be met, 
as well as the particular standing requirements under the APA.”). 
 67. See, e.g., Carpenter, 526 F.3d at 1241; Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. EPA, 494 F.3d 
1027, 1029–30 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Mahoney v. U.S. Consumer Prods. Safety Comm’n, 146 F. 
App’x 587, 589 (3d Cir. 2005) (nonprecedential). 
 68. See Carpenter, 526 F.3d at 1241 (citing Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491, 500–01 
(1977)). 
 69. See Cooper, supra note 12, at 843. 
 70. See id. 
 71. Memorandum from Randolph D. Moss, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of 
Legal Counsel, to Raymond C. Fisher, Assoc. Attorney Gen. (June 15, 1999), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/olc/consent_decrees2.htm (referring only to executive agency 
settlements, but with concerns that apply to all agency settlements). 
 72. Jacobs, supra note 7, at 113. 
 73. Id. at 116. 
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2.  Consent Decrees 
Settlements are different than “consent decrees,” another popular form of 
resolving administrative agency disputes.74  A consent decree is “an 
agreement between the parties to end a lawsuit on mutually acceptable 
terms which the judge agrees to enforce as a judgment.”75  Consent decrees 
differ from ordinary settlements because in an ordinary settlement once the 
parties have resolved their dispute there is no further judicial involvement.  
For consent decrees, in contrast, the court enters the settlement as a 
decree.76  This has the practical effect that “[i]f either party fails to live up 
to the agreement, the other party can obtain contempt sanctions without 
having to file an independent lawsuit on the contract.”77 
Consent decrees require court approval78 (which involves at least some 
judicial review)79 but can be functionally identical to settlements.  For 
example, Professor John Coffee notes that the SEC has a practice of 
including injunctions against further violation of the law when settling 
enforcement actions—making these settlements consent decrees—but 
argues these injunctions serve no practical purpose.80  Judicial review of 
consent decrees is not necessarily rigorous, and “will not usually reach the 
merits of the underlying dispute.”81  However, several district court 
decisions have recently approached agency consent decrees with increased 
 
 74. Consent decrees are not necessarily between agencies and private parties; two 
private parties can enter into a consent decree. See Donald C. Baur, Settlements in Particular 
Programs—Factors Distinguishing Administrative from Judicial Settlements—The 
Distinguishing Characteristics of Judicial Consent Decrees, in 1 LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION § 9:81 (Sheldon M. Novick et al. eds., 2013) (“Consent decrees are also used 
frequently to settle enforcement actions brought through citizen suits directly against 
polluters, without government intervention.”). 
 75. Larry Kramer, Consent Decrees and the Rights of Third Parties, 87 MICH. L. REV. 
321, 325 (1988).  But Professor Kramer notes that there is no consensus view on the precise 
meaning of a consent decree. See id. at 324–25. 
 76. See id. at 325. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See, e.g., Williams v. Vukovich, 720 F.2d 909, 920 (6th Cir. 1983) (“A consent 
decree is essentially a settlement judgment subject to continued judicial policing.”); United 
States v. City of Miami, 664 F.2d 435, 441 (5th Cir. 1981) (“‘[T]he [consent] judgment is 
not an inter partes contract . . . when [the court] has rendered a consent judgment it has 
made an adjudication.’” (quoting 1B JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL 
PRACTICE ¶ 0.409[5], at 1030 (2d ed. 1980))); see also 46 AM. JUR. 2D Judgments §§ 183, 
200 (2006). 
 79. See Kramer, supra note 75, at 358 (“Presently, all courts hold a fairness hearing 
before entering a consent decree.  This is a hearing at which interested third parties and 
amici may comment on the advantages or disadvantages of a settlement; after hearing their 
objections, the court may refuse to enter the proposed decree unless the parties revise it to 
take third-party concerns into account.  The Supreme Court assumed without actually 
holding that a fairness hearing was required in [Local No. 93, International Ass’n of 
Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 528–29 (1986)].” (footnotes omitted)). 
 80. See Coffee, supra note 7, at 7 (“[It is not] credible that the injunctive relief is that 
important to the SEC . . . because the SEC never seeks to enforce its injunctions through 
contempt . . . .”). 
 81. Jacobs, supra note 7, at 117. 
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skepticism.82  If agencies respond to the skepticism by removing demands 
for injunction, settlement reviewability will become increasingly important 
because these actions will not be subject to consent decree review.83 
Perhaps because judicial review of consent decrees is well established, 
courts rarely analyze whether they are unreviewable under § 701(a)(2).  
There have, however, been several cases where courts analyzed 
administrative agency consent decree reviewability under § 701(a)(2).  
Because these cases bear on the general issue of settlement reviewability, 
they are also discussed below.84 
3.  Plea Bargains 
A plea bargain is a “negotiated agreement between a prosecutor and a 
criminal defendant whereby the defendant pleads guilty to a lesser offense 
or to one of multiple charges in exchange for some concession by the 
prosecutor, [usually] a more lenient sentence or a dismissal of the other 
charges.”85  Plea bargaining is regulated by the courts, albeit loosely.86  In 
federal court, judges may reject plea agreements that include the dismissal 
of any charges or that include a specific sentence.  If the plea agreement 
merely involves a sentencing recommendation, then the judge cannot reject 
the guilty plea, but does get to make the sentencing determination.87  Thus, 
judges in federal court exercise some review as to the end result of every 
plea bargain. 
Judicial review of plea bargaining exists in spite of separation of powers 
concerns.  According to Professor Erwin Chemerinsky, lower courts have 
found that “there is a political question when there is a challenge to the 
exercise of executive discretion,”88 and the courts avoid political questions 
in order to avoid “judicial intrusion into the domain of the other branches 
 
 82. See FTC v. Circa Direct LLC, No. 11-2172, 2012 WL 2178705, at *1 (D.N.J. June 
13, 2012).  The parties in Circa Direct LLC addressed the court’s initial concerns, and the 
order was later approved. FTC v. Circa Direct LLC, No. 11-2172, 2012 WL 3987610, at *1 
(D.N.J. Sept. 11, 2012).  For another example of court skepticism of agency consent decrees, 
see SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., No. 11 Civ. 7387, 2011 WL 5903733, at *2–3 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2011). 
 83. See Noah, supra note 12, at 927 (“If courts began reviewing proposed consent 
decrees more vigorously, however, the government might prefer reaching out-of-court 
settlements with regulated entities, which would avoid judicial review altogether.”).  
Professor Noah bases his remark that settlements are unreviewable on NLRB v. United Food 
& Commercial Workers Union. See id. at 927 n.199 (citing NLRB v. United Food & 
Commercial Workers Union, 484 U.S. 112, 133 (1987)).  But, as observed in note 16, supra, 
that case refers only to settlements that are explicitly defined in the National Labor Relations 
Act (NLRA). See United Food, 484 U.S. at 118–19.  The Court held that those settlements 
were explicitly exempt from review under the NLRA via APA section 701(a)(1) and 
therefore did not reach the section 701(a)(2) question. See id. at 133 & n.31. 
 84. See infra Part III.A. 
 85. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1270 (9th ed. 2009). 
 86. See STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:  
CASES AND COMMENTARY 1030 (9th ed. 2007). 
 87. See id. at 1058. 
 88. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 150 (4th ed. 
2011). 
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[of government].”89  This includes prosecutorial discretion, a “core 
power[]” of the executive branch.90  However, in spite of the separation of 
powers, courts are nonetheless capable of reviewing plea bargains.91 
Agency settlements are comparable to plea bargains in criminal law.92  
While a detailed comparison between plea bargaining and agency 
settlement is beyond the scope of this Note, a limited comparison is useful 
because the Supreme Court has compared agency no-action decisions to 
criminal prosecutorial discretion when analyzing agency action 
reviewability.93 
Unlike the well-established judicial reviewability of plea bargains, 
reviewability of settlements is unclear.  The critical question is whether the 
APA’s “committed to agency discretion by law” exception, section 
701(a)(2), also applies to settlements. 
II.  THE “COMMITTED TO AGENCY DISCRETION BY LAW” EXCEPTION, 
5 U.S.C. § 701(A)(2) 
Before assessing whether the § 701(a)(2) exception applies to agency 
settlements, it is necessary to examine the exception in detail.  The Supreme 
Court has announced three different—perhaps competing—standards 
interpreting the meaning of § 701(a)(2).  This ambiguity has not been 
resolved, and lower courts continue to apply all of the standards announced 
by the Court.  To analyze the settlement question this section describes each 
of the standards in turn, introducing relevant scholarly arguments and 
describing applications by the lower courts. 
Part II.A discusses the Supreme Court’s first case to address the 
subsection, Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,94 which 
announced the “no law to apply” test.  Part II.B discusses Heckler v. 
Chaney,95 which introduced a four-factor analysis for examining whether 
particular types of agency action fall under § 701(a)(2).  Part II.C describes 
the “common law” approach to § 701(a)(2), which was first put forward by 
Justice Antonin Scalia in his dissent in Webster v. Doe,96 and arguably 
 
 89. Id. at 149. 
 90. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 457 (1996); see Andrew B. Loewenstein, 
Note, Judicial Review and the Limits of Prosecutorial Discretion, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 351, 
364 (2001) (“Traditionally, separation of powers has been understood to impose on the 
courts deference to prosecutorial decisions.”). 
 91. See supra notes 86–87 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Miller, 722 
F.2d 562, 565 (9th Cir. 1983) (describing how, even though “separation of powers requires 
that the judiciary remain independent of executive affairs,” courts are nonetheless “free to 
accept or reject individual charge bargains”). 
 92. See Noah, supra note 12, at 903 (“Plea bargaining also offers some interesting 
parallels to administrative arm-twisting.”).  Professor Noah considers agency settlements to 
be a type of “administrative arm-twisting.” Id. at 875. 
 93. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831–32 (1985); see also infra Part III.B. 
 94. 401 U.S. 402 (1971). 
 95. 470 U.S. 821 (1985). 
 96. 486 U.S. 592 (1988). 
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adopted by the Court in Lincoln v. Vigil.97  Lastly, Part II.D examines some 
scholarly perspectives on how § 701(a)(2) should be applied. 
A.  Overton Park’s “No Law To Apply” 
This section describes the “no law to apply” test, which was originally 
announced in Overton Park.  Part II.A.1 describes the Court’s opinion in 
Overton Park.  Part II.A.2 describes two problems of the test:  surplusage 
and “pure” abuse of discretion. 
1.  Announcing “No Law To Apply” 
In Overton Park, a citizens group alleged that the Secretary of 
Transportation had failed his statutorily mandated duty to examine all 
“feasible and prudent” alternatives before authorizing funds for a highway 
through a public park.98  The Secretary had not made formal findings 
inquiring into other alternative routes for the highway, and the citizens 
group contended that he thereby violated the statute.99  The Supreme Court 
observed that the Department of Transportation was an agency under the 
APA, making the fund authorization an “action” subject to review.100  The 
Court then considered, as a threshold question, whether the Secretary’s 
decision to authorize funds for the highway was unreviewable under 
§ 701(a)(2), and held it was not101 because it was a “very narrow exception” 
applicable only when there was “no law to apply.”102  The Court found that 
the feasible and prudent alternative requirement established the existence of 
“law to apply,”103 making the action reviewable. 
In Overton Park, the Court used legislative history to arrive at the “no 
law to apply” standard.104  A Senate report had described the clause as 
referring to instances where “statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in 
a given case there is no law to apply.”105  The Court seized on the “no law 
to apply” language and adopted that as the test.106 
2.  The Surplusage and “Pure” Abuse of Discretion Problems of 
“No Law To Apply” 
One commentator, Professor Levin, has vigorously attacked the “no law 
to apply” test.  Professor Levin argues that the test makes § 701(a)(2) mere 
surplusage.107  According to Professor Levin, under the theory of the Senate 
 
 97. 508 U.S. 182 (1993). 
 98. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 405–06. 
 99. Id. at 408. 
 100. Id. at 410. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting S. REP. NO. 79-752, at 26 (1945)). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id.; see Levin, supra note 9, at 705 (“The Court drew its ‘no law to apply’ test from 
the language of the Senate Judiciary Committee report on the APA.”). 
 105. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 410. 
 106. See id. 
 107. See Levin, supra note 9, at 705–06. 
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report, which he calls the “futility theory,” “agency action is ‘committed to 
agency discretion’ only when there are no grounds on which the action 
could possibly be set aside.”108  He continues, “When this condition is met, 
however, the agency action obviously would survive judicial review in any 
event.”109  Therefore, according to Professor Levin, in every unreviewable 
case, the agency would have won anyway, thus making the entire 
subsection surplusage.110 
Professor Levin also argues that the holding in Overton Park ignored the 
possibility that agency actions can be reviewed under what he calls “pure” 
abuse of discretion theories.111  In Overton Park, the Court held that 
§ 701(a)(2) applies when “statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a 
given case there is no law to apply.”112  This implies that statutes are the 
only source of “law to apply.”  However, according to Professor Levin, 
reviewing courts may also invalidate action on “pure” abuse of discretion 
theories, which “do not rest on an assertion that the agency misunderstood 
its governing statute or any other source of legal constraints.”113  He argues 
that courts are just as capable of reviewing agency actions for violation of 
“pure” abuse of discretion theories as they are for statutory violations, and 
therefore there is no reason why § 701(a)(2) should apply to one and not the 
other.114 
 
 108. Id. at 705; see also id. at 705–07.  Professor Levin notes that the “futility” theory is 
not the only possible interpretation of Overton Park’s “no law to apply” test, but argues that 
it is a plausible interpretation of that ruling, and that the Supreme Court clearly adopted the 
theory in Heckler v. Chaney, its next § 701(a)(2) case. See id. at 707 n.85.  For a discussion 
of Heckler v. Chaney, including the language that supports the “futility theory” of “no law to 
apply,” see infra Part II.B. 
 109. See Levin, supra note 9, at 705–06. 
 110. As Professor Levin notes, he is not the only scholar to argue that “no law to apply” 
makes the reviewability inquiry redundant with the analysis of whether the action survives 
on the merits.  Professor Cass Sunstein has echoed the point exactly: 
Once one has said that an action is unreviewable because there are no legal 
constraints on the exercise of discretion with respect to the particular allegation, 
one might as well say that, with respect to that allegation, there is no legal 
violation.  In this respect, the distinction between a conclusion that a decision is 
not reviewable and a conclusion that a decision is lawful is easy to collapse.  In 
both cases, one is saying the same thing:  that the governing statute does not 
impose legal constraints on the action at issue. 
See Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 653, 659 (1985).  But unlike Professor Levin, Professor Sunstein does not appear to 
view this redundancy as a defect. See id. 
 111. See Levin, supra note 9, at 707–08. 
 112. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971) 
(emphasis added) (quoting S. REP. NO. 79-752, at 26 (1945)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 113. See Levin, supra note 9, at 707–08. 
 114. See id. at 708–09 (“If judicial review of the agency’s factual perceptions, logic, and 
consistency is acceptable when the agency operates under significant statutory restrictions, it 
should be no less acceptable when the agency is not doing so.”).  Professor Levin’s 
surplusage and “pure” abuse of discretion arguments are alternative problems of the Overton 
Park holding:  if § 701(a)(2) applies even when an action could be invalidated for “pure” 
abuse of discretion, then it is not surplusage because it identifies a group of cases where 
§ 701(a)(2) independently protects an agency action from invalidation. 
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The circuit courts are split on whether an agency action is unreviewable 
under § 701(a)(2) even when it could theoretically be invalidated under a 
“pure” abuse of discretion theory.  The Eleventh Circuit holds that, so long 
as an agency’s discretion is not limited by any “statute, executive order, 
regulation, or treaty,” there is “no law to apply.”115  The D.C. Circuit, 
similarly, holds that there is “no law to apply” when “[an agency’s] 
governing statute confers such broad discretion as to essentially rule out the 
possibility of abuse.”116 
The Third and Ninth Circuits, in contrast, will determine that there is 
“law to apply” on a “pure” abuse of discretion theory.117  In Chehazeh v. 
Attorney General of the United States, the Third Circuit held that an agency 
decision was not entitled to § 701(a)(2) unreviewability because, the court 
concluded, past adjudications had established “a general policy” as to this 
form of decision, thereby making any subsequent decision reviewable for 
abuse of discretion.118  Because the agency action could be reviewed for 
abuse of discretion on “general policy” grounds, there was “a basis for 
judicial review”119—in other words, law to apply. 
In Pinnacle Armor v. United States, the Ninth Circuit adopted an even 
more expansive view, holding that any abuse of discretion standard satisfies 
“law to apply”: 
Indeed, although 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) insulates from judicial review 
agency discretion where there is no law to apply, the APA itself commits 
final agency action to our review for “abuse of discretion.” Those 
standards are adequate to allow a court to determine whether the [agency] 
is doing what it is supposed to be doing:  setting out standards and 
determining whether law enforcement products should be certified under 
those standards, whatever they may be.120 
The existence of the “pure” abuse of discretion problem may explain why, 
when analyzing § 701(a)(2) in the context of an enforcement action in 
Heckler v. Chaney, the Court opted for a different approach. 
 
 115. Conservancy of Sw. Fla. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 677 F.3d 1073, 1082 (11th 
Cir. 2012) (holding denial of a petition to designate a critical endangered species habitat 
unreviewable). 
 116. Amador Cnty. v. Salazar, 640 F.3d 373, 380 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Drake v. 
FAA, 291 F.3d 59, 70 (D.C. Cir. 2002)). 
 117. See Chehazeh v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 666 F.3d 118, 128–30 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(holding a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals to reopen removal proceedings 
reviewable because it could run counter to a general policy expressed in past adjudications); 
Pinnacle Armor, Inc. v. United States, 648 F.3d 708, 720 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 118. Chehazeh, 666 F.3d at 128–29. 
 119. Id. at 129–30. 
 120. Pinnacle Armor, 648 F.3d at 720 (citations omitted) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) 
(2006)). 
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B.  Heckler v. Chaney, Reaffirming “No Law To Apply,” but Also 
Introducing an Independent Factor Analysis 
This section examines Heckler v. Chaney,121 the Supreme Court’s next 
§ 701(a)(2) case after Overton Park.  As explained below, Chaney held that 
agency no-action decisions are entitled to a presumption of unreviewability 
under § 701(a)(2) and complicated the analysis of § 701(a)(2) by 
introducing four factors that influenced its holding on no-action decisions 
without clearly explaining how those factors related to “no law to apply.”  
Part II.B.1 introduces the Court’s decision.  Part II.B.2 describes lower 
court non-settlement applications of the decision. 
1.  The Court’s Opinion 
In Heckler v. Chaney, a group of death row inmates had petitioned the 
FDA, alleging that lethal injection drugs violated portions of the Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act and requesting that the FDA take enforcement 
actions to prevent the violations.122  The FDA refused the request, and the 
inmates subsequently filed suit in federal court, requesting that the FDA be 
required to take the requested enforcement actions.123 
The Supreme Court held that the FDA’s decision not to take an 
enforcement action was unreviewable under § 701(a)(2), and further, that 
all no-action decisions are presumptively unreviewable under the 
subsection.124 
The Court put forward two distinct justifications for its rule.  First, the 
Court reiterated Overton Park’s “no law to apply” standard, stating that an 
action is unreviewable when “the statute is drawn so that a court would 
have no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency’s exercise 
of discretion.”125  The statute provided no constraints on when to make a 
no-action decision, so there was “no law to apply.”126  Then, without 
clearly identifying the relationship to “no law to apply,” the Court identified 
four factors that compelled it to hold an agency no-action decision 
unreviewable under § 701(a)(2):  (1) the decision involved a “complicated 
balancing of a number of factors which are peculiarly within [the agency’s] 
expertise,” such as resource allocation, likelihood of success, and fit with 
the agency’s overall policies;127 (2) refusals to act “generally [do] not 
exercise [an agency’s] coercive power over an individual’s liberty or 
 
 121. 470 U.S. 821 (1985). 
 122. Id. at 823. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 832–33.  However, the unreviewability presumption “may be rebutted where 
the substantive statute has provided guidelines for the agency to follow in exercising its 
enforcement powers,” predicated refusal solely on belief it lacks jurisdiction, or adopted a 
general policy that is “so extreme as to amount to an abdication of its statutory 
responsibilities.” Id. at 833 & n.4. 
 125. Id. at 830.  This language articulates what Professor Levin calls the “futility” theory 
of “no law to apply.” See supra note 108. 
 126. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 830. 
 127. Id. at 831. 
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property rights, and thus [do] not infringe upon areas that courts often are 
called upon to protect”;128 (3) lack of “focus for judicial review”;129 and 
(4) similarity between no-action decisions and prosecutorial enforcement 
discretion, an area that had long been considered exempt from judicial 
review.130 
One of the challenges when analyzing § 701(a)(2) is that the section 
suffers an inherent interpretation problem.  As stated above, under the 
“futility” theory of “no law to apply,” which the court appeared to adopt, 
§ 701(a)(2) is mere surplusage.131  However, if the “futility” theory of “no 
law to apply” is not used, a second, different interpretation problem arises.  
As the Court observed in Chaney, while § 701(a)(2) states that any agency 
action “committed to agency discretion by law” is exempt from review, the 
APA also declares that “reviewing court[s] shall . . . hold unlawful and set 
aside agency action . . . found to be . . . an abuse of discretion.”132  The 
Court thus identified a potential conflict between the two uses of 
“discretion.”133  How can a court review an agency decision for abuse of 
discretion when it is not permitted to analyze decisions that are committed 
to agency discretion?  The Court concluded that “no law to apply” solves 
the problem because if an action has no standards under which it can be set 
aside, it cannot be reviewed for abuse of discretion, and, therefore, the two 
clauses never fight against each other.134  The Court ignored the possibility 
that this created the aforementioned surplusage issue. 
Professor Levin argues that the factor analysis is incompatible with, and 
actually undermines, Overton Park’s “no law to apply.”135  According to 
Professor Levin, “no law to apply” could not have sustained the 
unreviewability determination in Chaney because there were “judicially 
manageable standards” by which to judge the decision.136  Professor Levin 
argues that, for example, if “the FDA had declined to proceed against 
execution drugs on the ground that they were not dangerous at all,” and “the 
record contained strong contrary evidence,” a court could hold that the 
 
 128. Id. at 832. 
 129. See id. (“[W]hen an agency does act to enforce, that action itself provides a focus for 
judicial review, inasmuch as the agency must have exercised its power in some manner.”). 
 130. Id. 
 131. See supra notes 108–10 and accompanying text. 
 132. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006) (emphasis added). 
 133. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 830. 
 134. Id. 
 135. See Levin, supra note 9, at 712–15 (“On the surface, Chaney appeared to be a strong 
vindication of the Overton Park test of unreviewability; most commentators have read it that 
way.  When the Court’s reasoning is scrutinized, however, Chaney proves to be just the 
opposite.  The Court subtly undermined the ‘law to apply’ formalism, substituting a 
decidedly functional approach.”). But cf. Sunstein, supra note 110 (identifying the four 
factors as evidence that there was no law to apply). 
 136. See Levin, supra note 9, at 714 (“[O]ne can easily conceive of ways in which the 
Commissioner could have abused his discretion in responding to the prisoners’ petition, even 
if we assume that the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act did not limit the FDA’s enforcement 
discretion.”).  Professor Levin argues that Chaney adopted the “futility theory” of “no law to 
apply” and that this theory “standing alone, could not have logically supported the Court’s 
finding of unreviewability in Chaney.” Id. at 715. 
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decision was an abuse of discretion because it rested “on unjustifiable 
factual assumptions.”137  Thus, according to Professor Levin, the Court had 
to look beyond “law to apply” to hold the FDA’s decision unreviewable, 
and so instead based its decision on “functional” considerations—the factor 
analysis.138 
2.  Applying the Four Factors 
This section describes lower court analysis of each of the four Chaney 
factors:  “complicated balancing,” “focus for review,” “coercive power,” 
and the analogy to prosecutorial discretion. 
a.  “Complicated Balancing” (i.e., “Resource Allocation”) 
By far the most popularly employed and discussed of the four factors has 
been the “complicated balancing” factor.139  Judge Frank Easterbrook 
provided a typical justification for the resource allocation factor in the 
context of an SEC no-action decision: 
Doing nothing may be the most constructive use of the Commission’s 
resources. Congress gives the SEC a budget, setting a cap on its 
personnel.  With limited numbers of staff-years, the Commission must 
enforce several complex statutes.  To do this intelligently the 
Commissioners must assign priorities.  Prosecuting the [potential 
defendant] means less time for something else . . . .140 
Nonetheless, this passage perhaps too broadly states the strength of the 
factor.  Courts commonly use the resource allocation factor in “situations 
where agencies make large numbers of informal decisions about whether to 
enforce against individual parties.”141  Such decisions would potentially 
result in lots of new activity for the agency.  Heckler v. Chaney is the 
quintessential example for this concern.  In Heckler, if the Court had ruled 
that the no-action decision was reviewable, the FDA may have been 
required to investigate, or at least adduce reasons why it was not 
investigating, any substance that could arguably be under its control, 
regardless of the substance’s safety or popularity.142  Thus, rather than 
focusing on new drugs and unhealthy foods, the FDA could have 
 
 137. See id. at 714. 
 138. See id. at 717 (“Had the Court been prepared to adhere strictly to the Overton Park 
‘law to apply’ test, such policy considerations would have been irrelevant, and the case 
would have been over almost immediately.”). 
 139. See, e.g., Eric Biber, Two Sides of the Same Coin:  Judicial Review of Administrative 
Agency Action and Inaction, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 461, 486 (2008).  This Note also refers to 
this factor as the “resource allocation” factor, although the notion is more expansive than 
resource allocation, because it also includes agencies’ general policy goals. 
 140. Bd. of Trade v. SEC, 883 F.2d 525, 531 (7th Cir. 1989). 
 141. Biber, supra note 139, at 489; see, e.g., Block v. SEC, 50 F.3d 1078, 1081 (D.C. Cir. 
1995) (holding unreviewable the SEC’s rejection of a petition to hold a hearing to determine 
potential liability of directors of a corporation); Bd. of Trade, 883 F.2d at 531 (holding 
unreviewable an SEC no-action order). 
 142. See supra notes 122–23, 127 and accompanying text. 
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potentially been inundated with frivolous demands to review obviously 
noncontroversial products or unreasonably close variations on already 
approved products. 
However, resource allocation has also been applied where granting 
reviewability would not create new agency action but merely increase the 
cost of an existing agency action.  For example, in Ngure v. Ashcroft, the 
Eighth Circuit held unreviewable a policy of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (BIA) to use a single immigration judge, rather than a three-judge 
panel, in certain immigration hearings.143  The BIA had adopted the 
procedural shortcut because of a mounting caseload.144  The court ruled that 
BIA’s decision to switch to one judge was unreviewable, relying heavily on 
the resource allocation consideration.145  Here, had the court declared the 
decision reviewable, the result may have been that each adjudication would 
have been more costly—by requiring three times the number of judges—
but would not have forced the agency to take on new agency actions.  
However, on this particular regulation, the Eighth Circuit is in the minority; 
all the other circuit courts that have examined this BIA policy have found it 
reviewable, which lends added support for the “new action” theory.146 
On the other side, the D.C. Circuit has rejected resource allocation as a 
defense of unreviewability when it found that the agency’s decision was not 
within its exclusive expertise.  In Dickson v. Secretary of Defense, the court 
held reviewable servicemen’s petitions to be able to apply for upgrades on 
their discharge classifications because the Army Board for Correction of 
Military Records must make such determinations “in the interest of 
justice.”147  The court reasoned that “we have been shown no sufficient 
reason why the determination, on a case-by-case basis, of what is ‘in the 
interest of justice’ lies within the exclusive expertise of the Board.”148 
b.  Focus for Review 
Lower courts have held agency decisions reviewable because there is a 
“focus for review” when the agency has been forced to examine its 
decision.  For example, agency denials of rulemakings have focus for 
review because the APA requires the agency to give a brief reason for its 
denial.149  Likewise, in Dina v. Attorney General of the United States, 
Judge James Oakes argued that when the organic statute requires the agency 
 
 143. Ngure v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 975, 983 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 144. Id. at 980. 
 145. Id. at 983.  The resource concern was quite large in this case. Id.  “[O]ver 28,000 
appeals and motions are filed” with the BIA annually. Id. 
 146. Smriko v. Ashcroft, 387 F.3d 279, 294 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Chen v. Ashcroft, 378 
F.3d 1081, 1086–87 (9th Cir. 2004)); Batalova v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1246, 1252–54 (10th 
Cir. 2004); Denko v. INS, 351 F.3d 717, 731–32 (6th Cir. 2003); Haoud v. Ashcroft, 350 
F.3d 201, 206 (1st Cir. 2003)). 
 147. Dickson v. Sec’y of Def., 68 F.3d 1396, 1403 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
 148. Id. 
 149. See Am. Horse Prot. Ass’n v. Lyng, 812 F.2d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Farmworker 
Justice Fund, Inc. v. Brock, 811 F.2d 613, 636 (D.C. Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 817 
F.2d 890 (1987). 
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to examine its decision, there is focus for review.150  Statutory or regulatory 
requirements, however, are not the only way in which an agency might be 
forced to contemplate a decision. 
When circumstances force an agency to examine a decision, there is also 
a focus for review, even if the agency was not compelled by statute to 
examine the precise decision before the court.  For example, in 
Transportation Intelligence, Inc. v. FCC, the FCC had granted certification 
of a manufacturer’s radio system, and a rival manufacturer then petitioned 
for revocation of the certification.151  The FCC denied that request, and the 
rival manufacturer challenged the denial.152  Because the FCC had granted 
certification in the first instance, and therefore had been required to 
consider the certificate’s validity, the subsequent denial of the revocation 
petition had a focus for review.153 
Likewise, in Whitaker v. Clementon Housing Authority, Clementon 
Housing Authority had ceased providing a low-income tenant with funds 
necessary to pay rent on her apartment, allegedly in violation of federal 
regulations.154  The tenant petitioned the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) to take action against Clementon Housing 
Authority.155  HUD refused.  The court held that HUD’s refusal had focus 
for review because an “affirmative agency action ha[d] created the situation 
from which plaintiff now [sought] relief through agency enforcement 
action.”156 
Focus for judicial review is to some extent intertwined with the third 
Chaney factor, coercive power, because when agencies exercise coercive 
power, they create a focus for review.157  It is possible, however, to have 
focus for review without coercive power, for instance, when denying a 
rulemaking.158 
 
 150. Dina v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 793 F.2d 473, 477 (2d Cir. 1986) (Oakes, J., 
concurring) (arguing that the Attorney General’s denial of an application for waiver of an 
immigration requirement was reviewable because the relevant statute required a staff 
member of the agency to assess the waiver and submit a recommendation to the Attorney 
General).  The majority in Dina, however, held the Attorney General’s action unreviewable 
in part because the Attorney General, in conjunction with the U.S. Information Agency 
(USIA), had reviewed all the factors it was required to review. Cf. id. at 476–77 (per curiam) 
(“[W]hile regulations govern the submission to the [USIA], none offers adequate guidance to 
make review for abuse of discretion possible where the USIA has in fact considered the 
required factors on the required record.” (emphasis added)). 
 151. Transp. Intelligence, Inc. v. FCC, 336 F.3d 1058, 1060–62 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 1063 (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985)). 
 154. 788 F. Supp. 226, 227 (D.N.J. 1992). 
 155. Id. at 227–28. 
 156. Id. at 232. 
 157. See Eric Biber, The Importance of Resource Allocation in Administrative Law, 60 
ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 36–37 n.119 (2008) (citing Transp. Intelligence, 336 F.3d at 1063); Int’l 
Union, United Mine Workers v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 823 F.2d 608, 616 n.5 (D.C. 
Cir. 1987)). 
 158. See Conservancy of Sw. Fla. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 677 F.3d 1073, 1084 
(11th Cir. 2012). 
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c.  Coercive Force 
Agency actions must have a “direct influence” on a person or entity to 
have coercive force.  For example, the D.C. Circuit in Robbins v. Reagan 
held that agency decisions that amount to “rescissions of commitments” are 
reviewable because they “exert much more direct influence on the 
individuals or entities to whom the repudiated commitments were made” 
than no-action decisions.159  Likewise, courts hold that decisions made in 
conjunction with deportation actions have coercive force because the 
affirmative decision to deport the immigrant creates a situation from which 
he or she seeks relief—a direct influence.160 
The “direct influence” definition is consistent with Chaney.  The denial 
of the prisoner’s petition resulted only in an indirect influence, because it 
was only through allowing the drugs to be used that the prisoners 
themselves were influenced by the agency action.161  Likewise an agency 
decision denying a rulemaking does not have coercive force because it does 
not directly influence anyone,162 but only indirectly influences through later 
enforcement actions. 
d.  Prosecutorial Discretion 
Courts have referred to Chaney’s prosecutorial discretion factor when 
alluding to other areas of law in which “courts traditionally have been 
reluctant to intervene.”163  This “traditional” theory is discussed in detail 
below because it is also a general theory on the scope of § 701(a)(2).  
Prosecutorial discretion is also used to support164 or refute165 analogies to a 
no-action decision. 
 
 159. Robbins v. Reagan, 780 F.2d 37, 47 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (emphasis added) (holding 
reviewable a decision by HHS to close a homeless shelter). 
 160. See Carrillo v. Mohrman, 832 F. Supp. 1412, 1419 (D. Idaho 1989); Gurbisz v. INS, 
675 F. Supp 436, 444 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (holding reviewable a decision by the INS to deny 
extended voluntary departure status to an alien resident). 
 161. See supra text accompanying notes 121–23. 
 162. See Conservancy of Sw. Fla., 677 F.3d at 1084. 
 163. See N.D. ex rel. Bd. of Univ. & Sch. Lands v. Yeutter, 914 F.2d 1031, 1038 (8th Cir. 
1990) (Larson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (identifying prosecutorial 
discretion and national security); Shearson v. Holder, 865 F. Supp. 2d 850, 866 (N.D. Ohio, 
2011) (relating prosecutorial discretion and national security). 
 164. See Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Dole, 828 F.2d 799, 819 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Bork, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that an NHTSA decision to deny a petition to reopen an enforcement 
investigation should be unreviewable because it was sufficiently similar to a prosecutor’s 
discretion). 
 165. See Robbins v. Reagan, 780 F.2d 37, 47 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding an HHS decision 
to close a homeless shelter was not sufficiently similar to prosecutor’s discretion to 
constitute a no-action decision); Alliance to Save Mattaponi v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 
515 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2007) (holding that an EPA decision not to review a U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers permit issuance was reviewable because it was not sufficiently similar to 
prosecutor’s discretion to constitute a no-action decision). 
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C.  The “Common Law” of Judicial Review and Lincoln v. Vigil’s 
“Traditionally Committed to Agency Discretion” 
Early on after Chaney, it appeared that “no law to apply” would remain 
the dominant test for the § 701(a)(2) exception.  In Interstate Commerce 
Commission v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, the Supreme Court 
held that an agency refusal to reconsider a prior decision for material error 
was unreviewable because of “the impossibility of devising an adequate 
standard of review for such agency action,”166 echoing Chaney’s “no 
meaningful standard” language.167  The Brotherhood of Locomotive 
Engineers Court did not address the Chaney factors—for instance, the 
potentially large cost of forcing the agency to reconsider every decision 
after it has already been made. 
The Court next addressed 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) in Webster v. Doe, which 
also reaffirmed the primacy of “no law to apply.”168  In that case, an 
employee of the CIA alleged that he was wrongfully terminated for being 
homosexual, and challenged the termination as both a violation of the APA 
and of constitutional liberties.  The Court held that the APA challenge 
failed; the CIA Director’s decision was unreviewable because the organic 
statute gave the CIA Director the power to terminate an employee whenever 
“necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States.”169  The Court 
echoed Overton Park’s “no law to apply” standard, noting that there was 
“no basis on which a reviewing court could properly assess an Agency 
termination decision.  The language of [the organic statute] thus strongly 
suggests that its implementation was ‘committed to agency discretion by 
law.’”170  The Court did not employ Chaney’s four-factor analysis, which is 
very surprising, given that employment decisions directly impact an 
agency’s ability to manage its resources. 
Tellingly, Justice Scalia wrote a dissent that agreed with the Court’s APA 
holding but disagreed with its reasoning.171  He argued that “no law to 
apply” is not the exclusive test for 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2)172 and that the 
Court gave short shrift to Chaney by ignoring that case’s discussion of 
“general unsuitability” to judicial review.173  Justice Scalia then argued that 
§ 701(a)(2) refers to decisions that had traditionally been exempt from 
 
 166. Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 482 U.S. 270, 282 
(1987). 
 167. “No meaningful standard” is a “no law to apply” consideration. See supra note 108. 
 168. Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988). 
 169. Id. at 600.  The Court ultimately held the employee’s constitutional allegations were 
reviewable. Id. at 605. 
 170. Id. at 600 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1982)). 
 171. Justice Scalia dissented to the constitutional holding. Id. at 606 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
 172. Id. at 607–08 (“Perhaps Overton Park discussed only the ‘no law to apply’ factor 
because that was the only basis for nonreviewability that was even arguably applicable.  It 
surely could not have believed that factor to be exclusive, for that would contradict the very 
legislative history, both cited and quoted in the opinion, from which it had been 
derived . . . .”). 
 173. Id. at 607 (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985)). 
1390 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
review in a body of jurisprudence he called the “common law” of judicial 
review,174 which includes various principles including the “political 
question” doctrine, sovereign immunity, official immunity, prudential 
limitations upon the courts’ equitable powers, and “what can be described 
no more precisely than a traditional respect for the functions of the other 
branches.”175 
Justice Scalia argued that this view effectively distinguishes between the 
otherwise inconsistent uses of “discretion” in the APA176 because this 
reading of § 701(a)(2) identifies categories of agency decisions that are 
beyond review, thus preserving the possibility of abuse of discretion “when 
agency action is appropriately in the courts.”177 
The Webster Court’s decision to narrowly read the § 701(a)(2) exception, 
in spite of Justice Scalia’s forceful dissent, could be read as an affirmation 
of “no law to apply” over the Chaney factors.  But in the next case to 
address the issue, Lincoln v. Vigil,178 the Supreme Court again changed 
direction, appearing to adopt Justice Scalia’s approach. 
In Lincoln v. Vigil, the Court held that an agency decision to reallocate a 
lump-sum appropriation from a localized health program to a different 
national health program was unreviewable.179  The Court’s principle 
justification was that allocation of lump-sum appropriations is an area 
“traditionally . . . regarded as ‘committed to agency discretion.’”180  The 
Court identified both Chaney and Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers as 
cases identifying areas “traditionally left to agency discretion.”181 
The Court held that the lump-sum appropriation allocations are 
traditionally discretionary; according to the Court, it is “a fundamental 
principle of appropriations law” that lump-sum appropriations without 
statutory restrictions are disposable at the agency’s discretion.182  The Court 
further noted that case law clearly established that “‘a lump-sum 
appropriation leaves it to the recipient agency (as a matter of law, at least) 
to distribute the funds among some or all of the permissible objects as it 
sees fit.’”183 
The Court further reasoned that these appropriations were traditionally 
discretionary for the same reason as no-action decisions:  they require the 
 
 174. Id. at 608–09. 
 175. Id. 
 176. See supra note 133 and accompanying text (identifying the conflicting uses of 
“discretion”). 
 177. Webster, 486 U.S. at 609–10. 
 178. 508 U.S 182 (1993). 
 179. Id. at 184. 
 180. Id. at 191–92 (emphasis added) (“Over the years, we have read § 701(a)(2) to 
preclude judicial review of certain categories of administrative decisions that courts 
traditionally have regarded as ‘committed to agency discretion.’” (quoting Franklin v. 
Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 817 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasis added)). 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 192. 
 183. Id. (quoting Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of 
Am. v. Donovan, 746 F.2d 855, 861 (1984)). 
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same sort of balancing decision on agency goals and resources as a no-
action decision.184 
D.  Scholarly Viewpoints on the Application of § 701(a)(2) 
Scholars disagree on the proper test for § 701(a)(2).  Professor Eric Biber 
argues that a balancing test based upon resource allocation should be the 
sole test of “committed to agency discretion by law.”185  Professor Biber, 
however, also argues that the resource allocation concern is much weaker 
when, as in a settlement, an agency has begun and subsequently aborted an 
action.186  Professor Lisa Schultz Bressman, meanwhile, argues that Chaney 
in general and resource allocation in particular fail to capture the APA’s 
goal of preventing arbitrary decisionmaking.187 
1.  Professor Biber’s View:  Resource Allocation Is the Principal 
Reviewability Concern 
According to Professor Biber, Chaney’s action/inaction distinction is 
ineffectual188 and the other Chaney factors cannot persuasively account for 
its result.189  Professor Biber notes that the APA contains two 
complementary subsections, 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) and (2), which are meant to 
refer to inaction and action respectively.  Section 706(1) grants the courts 
authority to “compel action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.”  
Professor Biber argues that courts apply § 706(2), the “action” subsection, 
to issues that are properly within § 706(1), thereby negating the distinction 
between action and inaction.  For example, he cites a case where the First 
Circuit “‘set aside’ an agency’s pattern and practice of failing to properly 
enforce the law because it was arbitrary and capricious”—a standard 
rightly applied only under § 706(2).190 
According to Professor Biber, of the four Chaney factors—“resource 
allocation, prosecutorial discretion, ease of judicial review, and the proper 
role of the courts in protecting individual liberty”191—only resource 
allocation can adequately justify the ruling in Chaney.192 
Professor Biber argues the analogy to prosecutorial discretion is not a 
persuasive rationale when considered independently of resource allocation 
 
 184. Id. at 193. 
 185. Biber, supra note 157, at 9. 
 186. Id. at 29. 
 187. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction:  An Arbitrariness 
Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657 (2004). 
 188. Biber, supra note 157, at 4. 
 189. Biber, supra note 139, at 486. 
 190. Id. at 475 (emphasis added) (citing NAACP v. Sec’y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 817 
F.2d 149, 160 (1st Cir. 1987)). 
 191. Id. at 486.  Professor Biber does not explicitly examine “no law to apply.”  The 
language Professor Biber uses when referring to the four factors is slightly different than the 
language this Note uses.  When referring to “ease of judicial review” and “protecting 
individual liberties,” Professor Biber is referring to this Note’s “focus of judicial review” and 
“coercive force,” respectively. 
 192. Id. 
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because, he contends, prosecutorial discretion is itself generally defended 
on resource allocation grounds.193  According to Professor Biber, 
justifications for prosecutorial discretion “boil[] down to deference to how 
prosecutors should allocate their scarce resources among varying 
objectives.”194  Professor Biber acknowledges that prosecutorial discretion 
is often defended by referring to separation of powers concerns,195 but 
argues that the Supreme Court often references resource allocation when 
discussing the “functional grounds for those separation of powers 
concerns.”196 
Professor Biber argues that the “focus for judicial review” factor is 
unpersuasive because courts generally interpret it as a test of whether the 
agency has created a paper record,197 but “rarely, if ever” invalidate action 
because the inverse is true.198  In support, he cites Overton Park, where, in 
spite of the lack of paper record, the Court still held the agency’s decision 
reviewable.199 
Professor Biber argues that the final factor, coercive effect, suffers two 
problems.  First, it would require courts to analyze the significance of the 
aggrieved party’s interest, which is difficult.200  Second, it relies upon “an 
artificial distinction between whether a private party had a ‘right’ that the 
government took away . . . and whether the person had a ‘privilege’ that the 
government has simply refused to grant”—agency decisions not to grant a 
privilege are unreviewable, whereas decisions to take away a right are 
reviewable.201 
Professor Biber argues that, because of the problems with the other 
Chaney factors, courts should focus on resource allocation.  He contends 
that judicial review should not interfere in decisions involving resource 
allocation because such action could potentially cripple agencies by forcing 
them to make costly examinations of an enormous number of complaints.202  
For example, Biber identifies a pre-Chaney D.C. Circuit case, Medical 
Committee for Human Rights v. SEC, where the court observed that if SEC 
“no-action” letters were subject to judicial review, the SEC would 
effectively be barred from making such letters because the cost of litigating 
the no-action letter dispute would be greater than simply formalizing the 
 
 193. Id. (“Indeed, the justification that courts and legal scholars use for prosecutorial 
discretion generally boils down to deference to how prosecutors should allocate their scarce 
resources among varying objectives, such as maximizing the probability of winning cases, 
producing deterrence of future violations, and responding to public pressures and political 
priorities for prosecutions.”). 
 194. Id. 
 195. Biber, supra note 157, at 19 (citing United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 
(1996)). 
 196. Id. (citing Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464; Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 
396 (1987)). 
 197. Biber, supra note 139, at 486 & n.94. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. at 487. 
 200. See id. 
 201. Id. at 487–88. 
 202. See Biber, supra note 157, at 37–38. 
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decision.203  Meanwhile, the cost of formalizing every “no-action” letter 
would cripple the agency.204  Professor Biber argues that the Chaney Court 
“obliquely” recognized this issue when announcing the “focus for judicial 
review” factor, because holding no-action decisions reviewable might force 
agencies to create paper records that the courts could review, thus 
drastically increasing the cost for an enormous number of minute 
decisions.205 
Professor Biber, however, also argues that resource allocation concerns 
are weaker when, as in a settlement, an agency has begun and subsequently 
aborted an action.206  According to Biber, “the harm of requiring the agency 
to expend additional resources to ensure meaningful judicial review is 
relatively minimal.”207  Further, because an agency has already sunk effort 
into the action, “requiring the agency to recommence those proceedings will 
be less intrusive to the extent” that the agency can pick up where it left 
off.208 
2.  Professor Bressman’s View:  Arbitrariness Concerns Imply § 701(a)(2) 
Should Be Narrowly Construed 
Professor Bressman takes a view sharply opposed to Biber’s resource 
allocation theory, arguing that Chaney should be overturned because giving 
agencies enforcement discretion fails to prevent arbitrariness, which is a 
chief concern of the APA.209  According to Professor Bressman, 
arbitrariness is problematic because it is generally the result of agencies 
serving narrow interests rather than effectively performing their mission.210  
Professor Bressman argues that pro-Chaney scholarly viewpoints rely upon 
what she calls the “Accountability Theory of Agency Legitimacy.”211  
Within the accountability theory, the president is ultimately responsible for 
agency decisionmaking—what Bressman calls the “presidential control 
model.”212  Because agencies are thus accountable to the president, who is 
accountable to the popular will, the courts need not intervene.213  Professor 
Bressman argues that this view is popular because, “[n]ot only does the 
presidential control model reconcile agency decisionmaking with the 
ultimate form of majority rule, it squares such decisionmaking with the 
 
 203. Id. (citing Med. Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 674 (D.C. Cir. 
1970)). 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. at 36. 
 206. Id. at 29. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. (citing WWHT, Inc. v. FCC, 656 F.2d 807, 816–17 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). 
 209. Bressman, supra note 187, at 1657 (“[F]ounding principles of the administrative 
state are dedicated not only to promoting political accountability, but also to preventing 
administrative arbitrariness—and reserve a role for judicial review toward that end.”). 
 210. Id. at 1687–88. 
 211. Id. at 1675–78. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. at 1678 (“Courts should have little place micro-managing [enforcement 
priorities] when the President is available and suited to that function.”). 
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formal structure of our three-branch government by relocating agencies 
from the headless fourth branch to the executive branch.”214  Professor 
Bressman argues that this is an increasingly popular view tied in with the 
concept of the unitary executive, but ultimately incorrect.215 
According to Professor Bressman, accountability does not ward against 
arbitrariness.216  She notes that “an agency is subject to improper influences 
when it refuses to act, just as when it decides to act,”217 and that arbitrary 
decisionmaking is primarily the result of improper influence.218  
Meanwhile, although the president is accountable to the general populace, 
he “exercises control in a manner that is too corrupting and sporadic to 
reduce the potential for faction.”219 
Professor Bressman then argues that “arbitrary and capricious” review 
solves the problem by requiring reason giving and standard setting, thereby 
inserting transparency and consistency into the administrative process, and 
thus correctly effectuating the APA’s arbitrariness concern.220 
Professor Bressman is supported by Professor Robert Percival, who 
argues that presidents are not capable of directing the internal affairs of 
administrative agencies.221  Thus, under Professor Percival’s theory, even if 
presidents are properly accountable to the public, they would not be able to 
prevent agencies from engaging in arbitrary decisionmaking. 
III.  APPLYING § 701(A)(2) TO AGENCY SETTLEMENTS 
As stated above, the D.C. Circuit has announced a general rule that 
agency settlements are presumptively unreviewable because of § 701(a)(2).  
No other circuit court has established binding precedent on a general 
application of § 701(a)(2) to agency settlements.222  This section proceeds 
 
 214. Id. at 1677; see also Lisa Schulz Bressman, Beyond Accountability:  Arbitrariness 
and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 490 & n.146 (2002). 
 215. Bressman, supra note 187, at 1676–77 & n.99.  The unitary executive theory argues 
that the president has authority to direct the actions of administrative agencies because all 
executive power is vested in the president. See Robert V. Percival, Who’s in Charge?  Does 
the President Have Directive Authority over Agency Regulatory Decisions, 79 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2487, 2487 (2011). 
 216. Bressman, supra note 187, at 1660–61 (arguing that accountability does not protect 
against “narrowly interested administrative decisionmaking,” but that “such decisionmaking 
nonetheless is ‘arbitrary’ and objectionable”). 
 217. Id. at 1686. 
 218. Id. at 1688. 
 219. Id. at 1690. 
 220. Id. at 1690–91. 
 221. Percival, supra note 215, at 2488.  For a description of unitary executive theory, 
which generally argues that the president controls the entire executive branch, see STEVEN G. 
CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE:  PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM 
WASHINGTON TO BUSH (2008). 
 222. In a nonprecedential opinion, the Third Circuit followed the D.C. Circuit, holding 
settlements are presumptively unreviewable. See Mahoney v. U.S. Consumer Prods. Safety 
Comm’n, 146 F. App’x 587, 590 (3d Cir. 2005).  The Ninth Circuit, however, has ruled 
individual settlement decisions reviewable in at least two instances. See United States v. 
Carpenter, 526 F.3d 1237, 1241 (9th Cir. 2008); Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v. Bonneville 
Power Admin., 501 F.3d 1009, 1013, 1031–32 (9th Cir. 2007). 
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in two parts.  Part III.A describes the course of the D.C. Circuit’s 
§ 701(a)(2) settlement jurisprudence.  Part III.B describes the D.C. Circuit’s 
separation of powers concern if agency settlements are reviewable. 
A.  The D.C. Circuit’s Schering Line:  Evolving from Simple No-Action 
Decisions to Comprehensive “Settlement Rulemaking” 
The D.C. Circuit extended Chaney’s presumption of unreviewability to 
an agency settlement decision more than twenty years ago in Schering 
Corp. v. Heckler.223  In that case, the settlement was little more than a 
binding time-limited nonenforcement decision.224  Since then, however, the 
D.C. Circuit has extended unreviewability to traditional settlements—
settlements whereby the private actor pays some form of monetary 
consideration in return for cessation of an enforcement action or dismissal 
of a suit that could have resulted in harsher sanctions like a larger fine.225  
Recently, the court held unreviewable a “Settlement Rulemaking”—a 
comprehensive plan offering settlements to all regulated entities without 
assessing each case’s individual merits.226  The D.C. Circuit has largely 
relied upon Chaney’s factor analysis, in particular the “complicated 
balancing” factor, rather than Overton Park’s “no law to apply.”  This 
section traces the evolution of the D.C. Circuit’s settlement decisions. 
1.  Schering Corp. v. Heckler:  Agency Settlement May Be  
Akin to a No-Action Decision 
In Schering Corp. v. Heckler, the FDA had instituted a seizure against 
Tri-Bio, a drug manufacturer, for failure to seek FDA approval for a drug, 
Gentaject.227  Tri-Bio sued the FDA, seeking a determination that Gentaject 
was not a “new animal drug” and therefore required no approval.228  The 
FDA and Tri-Bio then settled the case—the FDA would not bring 
enforcement litigation against Gentaject for eighteen months, giving the 
FDA time to examine the drug’s status.229  Schering Corporation, the maker 
of the drug upon which Gentaject is based, sued the FDA, challenging the 
settlement with Tri-Bio.230 
The court held the FDA’s settlement decision unreviewable, reasoning 
that it was little more than a decision not to prosecute for a set period of 
time.231  The court explained that “the settlement agreement merely holds 
enforcement in abeyance until the agency can determine whether Gentaject 
 
 223. 779 F.2d 683, 685–86 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
 224. See id. 
 225. See Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. EPA, 494 F.3d 1027, 1029–30 (D.C. Cir. 2007); 
N.Y. State Dep’t of Law v. FCC, 984 F.2d 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
 226. See infra Part III.A.3. 
 227. Schering Corp., 779 F.2d at 684. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. at 685. 
 230. Id. at 684. 
 231. Id. at 686. 
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is a product subject to the Act’s requirements,” which, as a “paradigm case 
of enforcement discretion,”232 was unreviewable under Chaney.233 
The court also reiterated Chaney’s concern that enforcement decisions 
“involve a complex balancing of an agency’s priorities, informed by 
judgments ‘peculiarly within its expertise.’”234  But it did not hold that all 
settlements should be unreviewable; rather, that this particular settlement 
decision was an unreviewable exercise of enforcement discretion.235 
2.  New York State Department of Law v. FCC:  Applying the Chaney 
Factor Analysis to Settlements 
The D.C. Circuit next addressed agency settlement in New York State 
Department of Law v. FCC.236  In this case, the court explicitly rejected the 
notion that settlements are exactly like no-action decisions,237 but 
nonetheless held they are presumptively unreviewable under Chaney’s 
resource allocation factor. 
The FCC has certain rules and policies about the fee rates that a 
telephone company may charge an affiliate to prevent regulated affiliates 
from overcharging customers by passing fees through nonregulated 
affiliates.238  After an investigation, the FCC concluded that certain 
affiliates of a telephone company “appear[ed] to have violated [the FCC’s] 
affiliate transaction rules and policies” and that there was a valid basis for 
enforcement proceedings.239 
The FCC issued an order to show cause240 why the telephone affiliates 
should not be subject to various sanctions, including adjusting certain 
accounting statements and paying a forfeiture of almost $1.5 million.241  
The telephone affiliates contested the enforcement proceeding; 
subsequently, the FCC entered into a consent decree.242  The consent decree 
required the telephone affiliates to adhere to all the terms of the order to 
 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. at 684. 
 234. Id. at 685 (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985)). 
 235. Id. at 686 (“While we do not hold that any agency settlement with a potential 
regulatee, whatever its terms, is unreviewable under Chaney, we think it clear that in this 
case the agreement merely embodies a legitimate exercise of enforcement discretion.”). 
 236. 984 F.2d 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
 237. Id. at 1214 (“This case differs from Chaney in that it involves a decision to settle an 
enforcement action once begun, not a decision whether to initiate the action in the first 
place.”). 
 238. Id. at 1210–11. 
 239. Id. at 1212 (alteration in original) (quoting Order To Show Cause, In re N.Y. Tel. 
Co. & New Eng. Tel. & Tel. Co., 5 FCC Rcd. 866, 869 (1990)). 
 240. Id. at 1211.  The order to show cause started the enforcement proceeding, notified 
the regulated entity of sanctions, and gave it thirty days to respond before the sanctions 
would take effect. Order To Show Cause, supra note 239, at 866. 
 241. N.Y. State Dep’t of Law, 984 F.2d at 1211–12. 
 242. Id. at 1212.  The consent decree was entered by the FCC itself, not an Article III 
court. 
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show cause except that they were to pay the $1.5 million as a voluntary 
contribution to the U.S. Treasury rather than as a forfeiture.243 
The New York State Department of Law and a private party challenged 
the consent decree because they were disappointed with its terms.244  They 
argued that the FCC had underestimated the extent of the overcharging, and 
that the settlement was not consistent with the FCC’s statutory enforcement 
duties and further violated the agency’s ex parte communications rules and 
the APA’s notice and comment requirements.245 
The D.C. Circuit held the FCC’s decision to enter into the consent decree 
was entitled to the presumption of unreviewability and that the parties 
challenging the decree failed to overcome the presumption.246  The court 
noted that this case was different than a no-action decision because it did 
not involve the decision whether to initiate an action, but rather whether to 
end one.247  Nonetheless, the court held that settlements should be 
unreviewable under Chaney.  The court noted that the FCC is best 
positioned to weigh the benefits and costs of pursuing an adjudication and 
the likelihood of success.248  Rejecting the challenger’s argument that the 
agency erred by only pursuing one theory of liability, the court observed 
that if it required agencies to always demand all legal remedies available, 
that would create an “all-or-nothing approach” that “would discourage 
many responsible and fruitful enforcement actions.”249 
The court was careful to distinguish another case, MCI 
Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, where it had held reviewable an FCC 
decision to end an enforcement action because “it was based on a premise 
that ‘everyone involved knew, and . . . the FCC had conceded at argument it 
knew’ to be faulty”250—an instance of granting reviewability on a “pure” 
abuse of discretion theory.251  The court, however, concluded that MCI was 
distinguishable because there, the FCC had completed an adjudication on 
the merits, whereas in this case, the enforcement action was terminated 
before any legal issues could be resolved.252  This reasoning would appear 
to create the counterintuitive result—from the perspective of a third party—
that if an agency’s enforcement division settled a case before it had reached 
an outcome within agency adjudication, it would be unreviewable, but if the 
agency enforcement division prevailed during agency adjudication and then 
 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id.  Because the settlement terms were very similar to the FCC’s original demands, 
one imagines that, had the enforcement action been completed, they would have challenged 
that instead. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. at 1215 (“We conclude, therefore, that the FCC’s decision to enter into the 
Consent Decree with the [telephone affiliates] is non-reviewable under Chaney.”). 
 247. Id. at 1214. 
 248. Id. at 1213. 
 249. Id. at 1216. 
 250. Id. at 1214 (citing MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. FCC, 917 F.2d 30, 41 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). 
 251. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 252. N.Y. State Dep’t of Law, 984 F.2d at 1214.  The New York State Department of Law 
court noted that in MCI Telecommunications Corp., the situation was so different that neither 
the court nor the agency mentioned Chaney. See id. 
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settled after being challenged in an Article III court, the settlement would 
be reviewable even on a pure abuse of discretion theory. 
3.  Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. EPA:  Using Settlements  
To Simulate a Rulemaking 
Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. EPA is the most recent D.C. Circuit case 
upholding the presumption of unreviewability for agency settlement.253  In 
this case, the D.C. Circuit held that a regulatory scheme to offer settlements 
to any regulated entity potentially affected by a recent regulation was 
unreviewable, even though, by creating a general scheme, the agency was 
not exercising enforcement discretion on a case-by-case basis. 
Under the Clean Air Act and other statutes, the EPA regulates certain air 
pollutants.254  Animal feeding operations (AFOs), which are facilities that 
raise animals for eggs, dairy, and meat, create these pollutants, but the EPA 
lacked the means to measure their output.255  Roughly speaking, AFOs emit 
the regulated pollutants in proportion to their size.256  Rather than initiate 
enforcement actions with an insufficient emissions-measuring 
methodology, the EPA offered every AFO a standardized “Consent 
Agreement,” which is a settlement.257  The Consent Agreement required the 
AFO to pay a civil penalty for potential violations based on the AFO’s size 
and to help fund a study to develop an emissions-estimating 
methodology.258  In return, the EPA agreed not to pursue enforcement 
actions for a set period of time.259 
Community and environmental groups challenged the settlement 
scheme.260  They argued that the EPA exceeded its statutory authority and 
that the settlements were actually rules disguised as enforcement actions.261  
Part of the challengers’ concern was probably the relatively generous offer 
of the settlement scheme.  As Judge Judith Rogers noted in her dissent, 
AFOs that agreed to the settlement were able to buy at least two years of 
exemption from enforcement for at most $100,000, whereas, in the absence 
of the settlement scheme, “‘potential civil penalties could run up to $32,500 
per day per violation.’”262 
The court reasoned that this particular settlement was entitled to the 
presumption of unreviewability because of the settlement rule in Schering 
Corp.,263 and because of Chaney’s “complicated balancing” factor.  It noted 
that the EPA made a determination that the standardized settlement scheme 
 
 253. Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. EPA, 494 F.3d 1027, 1031 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 254. Id. at 1028. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. at 1029. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. at 1030. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. at 1038 n.1 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 263. Id. at 1031 (majority opinion). 
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would “lead to quicker industry-wide compliance,” and that “judgments—
arising from considerations of resource allocation, agency priorities, and 
costs of alternatives—are well within the agency’s expertise and 
discretion.”264 
The court held that, because the relevant statutes were framed in 
permissive rather than mandatory terms, the agency had discretion whether 
to enforce.265  The court noted that, under the relevant statutes, the 
president “may” bring an enforcement action to asses a penalty.266  The 
court did note that the statutes provide limitations on the dollar amounts for 
each type of violation, but held that this was insufficient to infer that the 
agency’s enforcement discretion was restricted.267 
Judge Rogers, in dissent, argued that this enforcement action was not 
committed to agency discretion.  By assessing a monetary fine, she argued, 
the EPA had exercised its coercive power, and therefore, under Chaney, the 
action should not be entitled to a presumption of unreviewability.268  Judge 
Rogers also argued that, because the settlements were offered generally, 
they did not constitute the form of case-by-case enforcement discretion 
contemplated in Chaney.269 
In addition to the § 701(a)(2) exemption, the D.C. Circuit has also raised 
the argument, discussed below, that holding agency settlements reviewable 
might be a separation of powers problem. 
B.  The D.C. Circuit’s Separation of Powers Argument 
In one case, Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission,270 the D.C. Circuit also stated that settlement decisions should 
be presumptively unreviewable because to hold otherwise would create a 
separation of powers problem.271  According to the Baltimore Gas court, 
one reason for the Chaney presumption was that “[w]hen the judiciary 
orders an executive agency to enforce the law it risks arrogating to itself a 
power that the Constitution commits to the executive branch.”272  The court 
found that under the Take Care Clause of the Constitution,273 the powers 
both “to decline to enforce a law [and] to enforce a law in a particular way” 
 
 264. Id. at 1031–32. 
 265. Id. at 1032. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. 
 268. Id. at 1041 (Rogers, J., dissenting). 
 269. Id. 
 270. 252 F.3d 456, 459–60 (D.C. Cir. 2001).  The D.C. Circuit does not raise separation 
of powers in any other agency settlement reviewability case. 
 271. Id. at 459 (“Indeed, Chaney’s recognition that the courts must not require agencies to 
initiate enforcement actions may well be a requirement of the separation of powers 
commanded by our Constitution.”). 
 272. See id. 
 273. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“[The President] shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed . . . .”). 
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are committed to the executive branch.274  Under the court’s theory, 
settlement is a decision to “enforce a law in a particular way.” 
The court then noted, in contrast, that if Congress wished to restrict 
executive agency enforcement discretion, it could do so because, “[u]nlike a 
judicial command to initiate an enforcement action, Congress’s authority to 
impose discretion-curtailing limitations is fully consistent with the 
executive’s power to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.  Such 
restrictions are simply an instance of lawmaking, a power committed to 
Congress by the Constitution.”275 
IV.  BALANCING ALL FOUR CHANEY FACTORS:  SETTLEMENTS  
ARE NOT PRESUMPTIVELY UNREVIEWABLE 
Settlements should not be entitled to a presumption of unreviewability 
under § 701(a)(2).  Under “no law to apply,” settlements are not 
distinguishable from no-action decisions.  However, analyzing no-action 
decisions under “no law to apply” is problematic, and settlements share 
those problems.  Under Chaney’s factor analysis, the “complicated 
balancing” resource allocation factor cuts in favor of unreviewability, but 
considerably less strongly than for no-action decisions.  Meanwhile, the 
other three factors each indicate settlements should be reviewable. 
This section proceeds in three parts.  Part IV.A applies “no law to apply” 
to settlement decisions.  Part IV.B applies Chaney’s factor analysis.  Part 
IV.C addresses the separation of powers argument. 
A.  “No Law To Apply” Is an Unworkable Test for  
Enforcement Decisions, Including Settlements 
From a “no law to apply” perspective, settlements are not distinguishable 
from no-action decisions.  Chaney announced that there is “no law to 
apply” when there is “no meaningful standard against which to judge the 
agency’s exercise of discretion.”276  Chaney distinguished its enforcement 
no-action decision from Overton Park’s highway fund allocation because 
the no-action decision was unconstrained by statute, whereas the fund 
allocation required the agency to perform specific statutory duties in 
conjunction with the decision.277  Thus, the highway fund allocation 
decision was “constrained by statute,” and the no-action decision was 
not.278  Unless otherwise constrained by statute, then, settlements are akin 
to no-action decisions under the reasoning in Chaney. 
However, as Professor Levin argues, the factor analysis, rather than “no 
law to apply,” was the driving force behind the Chaney decision.279  
 
 274. Balt. Gas, 252 F.3d at 459 (emphasis added). 
 275. Id. 
 276. See supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
 277. See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
 278. See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
 279. See supra notes 135–36 and accompanying text. 
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Settlements and no-action decisions are both enforcement decisions,280 and 
therefore are far more closely related to each other than to highway funding 
decisions.  If the factor analysis is the appropriate test for no-action 
decisions, it should apply for settlements as well. 
Professor Levin’s argument that “no law to apply” was not the driving 
force behind Chaney is compelling.  There are at least three reasons 
indicating that “no law to apply” was insufficient to support the ruling. 
First, the Chaney Court did not rest on its “no law to apply” argument, 
but rather continued to its factor analysis. 
Second, “no law to apply” cannot answer the “pure” abuse of discretion 
problem.  No-action decisions are susceptible to “pure” abuse of discretion 
theories—for example, that an agency’s no-action decision might rest on an 
unjustifiable factual assumption.281  Settlements suffer the same problem.  
If courts do not use “pure” abuse of discretion when analyzing 
reviewability, they risk declaring agency actions “committed to agency 
discretion by law,” even though those actions have judicially manageable 
standards for rejection under “abuse of discretion.”282  If, however, they do 
use pure abuse of discretion, they eviscerate § 701(a)(2) because there is 
always some applicable standard.283 
Finally, as Justice Scalia argued, § 701(a)(2) should not be limited to 
instances where agency discretion is statutorily constrained because the text 
of the subsection expresses a more expansive notion of unreviewability.284  
Note that this does not mean that the world of § 701(a)(2) exceptions is a 
strict superset of the statutory constraint test, but rather that it merely covers 
a broader range of possible agency action. 
These three arguments together support the position that “no law to 
apply” is not alone sufficient to generate an inference of unreviewability in 
all cases.  This viewpoint is entirely consistent with Overton Park, where 
the Court, despite the language it chose,285 merely held that because there 
was “law to apply,” there was reviewability, but did not hold that the 
inverse was true as well.286  This explains why the Chaney court used a 
different test altogether—the factor analysis—whose application is 
discussed below. 
 
 280. See supra note 232 and accompanying text. 
 281. See supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
 282. See supra notes 112–14 and accompanying text. 
 283. See supra note 113. 
 284. See supra note 172. 
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B.  Settlements Are Not No-Action Decisions and They Are Reviewable 
Under Chaney’s Four-Factor Analysis 
Under a correct reading of Chaney, settlements are reviewable.  First, as 
explained below, settlements are meaningfully different than no-action 
decisions.  Second, under the four-factor analysis, the “complicated 
balancing” resource allocation factor cuts in favor of unreviewability, but 
considerably less strongly than for no-action decisions.  Meanwhile, the 
other three factors each indicate settlements should be reviewable. 
Settlements bear a superficial resemblance to no-action decisions 
because, from the agency’s perspective, they take the form of a promise not 
to enforce a rule or regulation.287  However, as observed by the D.C. 
Circuit, settlements are different than no-action decisions because no-action 
decisions are decisions whether to initiate actions, whereas settlements are 
decisions to conclude them.288  For this reason, reviewability of settlements 
and no-action decisions has very different implications in terms of an 
agency’s discretion to manage its resources—discussed in detail below.  
This no-action definition is consistent with Chaney, which was a denial of a 
petition by a third party to launch an enforcement action, and with the D.C. 
Circuit’s decisions in New York State Department of Law and Ass’n of 
Irritated Residents, which argue settlements are unreviewable not because 
they are no-action decisions, but rather based on Chaney’s factor 
analysis.289  That being said, a careful examination of Chaney’s factor 
analysis reveals that settlements should not be presumptively unreviewable. 
“Complicated balancing” presents the strongest argument in favor of 
holding settlements unreviewable.  Much of the “complicated balancing” 
reasoning used in Chaney applies to settlements as well.  If settlements are 
reviewable, agencies might be forced to pursue or abandon weak claims, 
without the ability to salvage the work they have done by seeking a partial 
recovery.290  Likewise, agencies might have less flexibility to construct the 
plan that they think best meets their policy objectives; Ass’n of Irritated 
Residents, for example, can be viewed as a creative solution by the EPA to 
figure out how to measure gas pollutants produced by farm animals.291 
The complicated balancing justifications for settlements are, however, 
considerably weaker than for no-action decisions.  Courts commonly use 
the resource allocation factor to protect agencies when they must make 
large numbers of informal decisions.292  If no-action decisions were 
reviewable, it could potentially cripple agencies by forcing them to make 
costly examination of an enormous number of complaints.293  Settlement 
reviewability, however, does not suffer the same problem.  Rather than 
 
 287. See supra Parts I.C.1, III.A.I. 
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exposing the agency to costly examinations of new complaints, settlement 
reviewability merely forces agencies to expend more resources on 
preexisting investigations, and even then only if they choose to settle, rather 
than abandon the investigation outright.294 
Admittedly, Ngure v. Ashcroft, where the Eleventh Circuit held that the 
BIA’s decision to use a single immigration judge rather than a three-judge 
panel was unreviewable, cuts against this argument.295  But that case is 
different; the BIA oversees over 28,000 appeals and motions filed 
annually,296 so holding the decision reviewable could have potentially 
tripled an enormous cost.  Further, all the other circuit courts to have 
considered the issue in Ngure held that it was reviewable, reinforcing the 
“new action” theory.297 
Arbitrariness is also a concern that weighs against resource allocation 
justifications for unreviewability.  As Professor Bressman argues, one of 
the APA’s principle concerns was arbitrariness.298  Even if administrative 
agencies are meaningfully accountable to elected officials—a debatable 
proposition299—that kind of accountability still does not ward against 
arbitrariness.300  Professor Bressman was concerned with unreviewability 
of no-action decisions, but the same concerns apply to settlements as well.  
Arbitrariness concerns arguably motivated Judge Rakoff’s skepticism over 
the “troubling” inconsistencies in SEC’s Citigroup and Goldman Sachs 
consent decrees,301 and possibly Judge Rogers’s dissent in Ass’n of Irritated 
Residents, where the EPA was offering settlements for considerably lower 
dollar amounts than the potential civil penalties imposable under the 
statute.302  For these reasons, “complicated balancing” is an insufficient 
justification to hold settlements unreviewable. 
Settlements, unlike no-action decisions, have “focus for judicial review” 
because the agency must have examined the settlement decision.  Lower 
courts routinely hold agency actions have “focus for judicial review” 
whenever, either by statute or by the circumstances under which the action 
occurred, the agency was compelled to contemplate its decision.303  
Settlements necessarily occur after an agency has performed an 
investigation of alleged misconduct.  Much like the FCC’s consideration of 
the prior grant of certification in Transportation Intelligence, Inc.,304 the 
pre-settlement investigation serves as a focus point for judicial review. 
Settlements also generally have coercive power because they exert a 
“direct influence” over the regulated entity.  Settlements occur when the 
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regulated entity furnishes consideration.305  Such consideration is a “direct 
influence” from the action of settlement. 
Finally, under the prosecutorial discretion analogy, the fourth Chaney 
factor, settlements should be reviewable.  Plea bargains are negotiated 
agreements between the prosecutor and the defendants whereby the 
defendant furnishes consideration in the form of a guilty plea in exchange 
for a lesser charge or other concession from the prosecutor,306 making them 
the appropriate analog for settlements.307  Unlike prosecutors’ decisions not 
to indict, plea bargains are subject to judicial review, implying that 
settlements should also be subject to review.308 
Settlements, therefore, should not be presumptively unreviewable under 
§ 701(a)(2).  Settlements do not severely restrict agencies’ “complicated 
balancing” considerations, and those considerations must be balanced 
against meaningful arbitrariness concerns.  Meanwhile, the other three 
Chaney factors each indicate that settlements should be reviewable. 
C.  Separation of Powers Concerns Are Unwarranted 
The Baltimore Gas court’s separation of powers argument309 suffers 
several problems.  First, while it is true that prosecutorial decisions on who 
and how to charge are within the “core functions” of the executive branch, 
and therefore awarded deference,310 that deference does not extend to plea 
bargain decisions.311  If judicial review of plea bargains does not violate the 
separation of powers, then neither should review of agency settlements. 
Second, the Baltimore Gas court concedes that Congress could “impose 
discretion-curtailing limitations” on administrative agency enforcement 
decisions.312  By imposing a comprehensive scheme of judicial review on 
agency action—including the § 701(a)(2) exemption—Congress has already 
spoken to the issue.  If settlement decisions are not included in the 
§ 701(a)(2) exemption then Congress has imposed the discretion-curtailing 
limitation, and, therefore, there is no separation of powers concern.  This 
explains why, when Justice Scalia invokes the “political question” doctrine 
in Webster v. Doe, he does so to determine the proper construction of 
§ 701(a)(2),313 rather than to attack the basic framework of judicial review 
of agency action.  Therefore, separation of powers is not a bar to agency 
settlement reviewability. 
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CONCLUSION 
Administrative agency settlements have recently come under increased 
judicial scrutiny.  While agency actions are presumptively reviewable under 
the APA, the Supreme Court held in Heckler v. Chaney that agency no-
action decisions are presumptively unreviewable because they are 
“committed to agency discretion by law” under APA section 701(a)(2).  
Settlements are a “blind spot” within the APA, and the Supreme Court has 
not ruled on their general reviewability.  The D.C. Circuit has ruled that 
they are presumptively unreviewable, but no other circuit has established 
binding precedent on the issue.  However, based on the criteria set forth in 
Chaney, settlements should be reviewable.  This viewpoint is consistent 
with the APA’s general concern of preventing arbitrary decisionmaking by 
imposing judicial review on agency actions. 
 
